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Overview
ou’ve found your target, there are 
obvious cost synergies, the cultural 
fit is compelling, it gives you access 
to new markets and the price looks right. But 
what about becoming responsible for the 
livelihoods of 130,000 people who don’t even 
work for the company you’re acquiring? This 
is the reality that could have faced buyers of 
Tata’s UK steel assets, and why government 
intervention was needed to remove the 
obstacle. At the critical moment, the pension 
deficit was around £700m. 
At this point, the acquirer is likely to start 
thinking about 1) how to minimise risk, 
probably through the choice of 
acquisition currency used (cash, stock, or 
some mixture of each) and 2) whether 
pension risk, which is by its nature open 
ended, should be a reason not to do the 
deal at all. These two questions are the 
focus of this report. 
Acquisition currency 
The question of what to use to pay would 
usually be a function of: 
- Target location (in a cross border deal 
shareholders of the target may not be 
able to hold overseas listed stock) 
- Management’s view of its own share 
price (over-valued / under-valued) 
- Expectations of target management. 
To these we would add the pension position 
(of both target and acquirer). 
Numerous theoretical and empirical studies 
have examined the impact of the method of 
payment in corporate takeovers on the 
shareholder value outcomes for bidder and 
target shareholders. And taking a step back 
from the specific issues around pension 
deficits, it has been found that in general cash 
offers create more value for both bidder and 
target shareholders in both the short and long 
term. This finding is based on numerous 
studies: Hansen (1987), Schlingemann 
(2004) and Golubov et al (2015). There is an 
interesting exception to this rule in the context 
of pensions. 
Shareholder value creation 
In an acquisition, a company seeking to 
acquire another will have to take into account 
the latter’s pension scheme (e.g., whether 
defined benefit (DB) or defined contribution 
(DC), its funding position and its risk profile). 
Where the target firm’s pension is 
underfunded, it may lead to the buyer having 
to contribute towards eliminating that 
underfunding. The buyer needs to take into 
account how the target’s pension scheme will 
alter its financial risk profile, credit rating and 
cost of capital as well as its future investment 
programme. These concerns will be reflected 
in the takeover premium that the acquirer is 
willing to pay for the target and the way it 
finances the acquisition. Thus, the target 
pension scheme risk profile is likely to 
influence both the acquirer’s choice of 
payment currency and its shareholder value 
gains thereafter. 
Hence the second leg of research in this 
paper on whether pension risk should be a 
reason not to do the deal. 
Here are our conclusions on the two issues: 
- We find that target pension scheme type 
has a significant impact on the choice of 
payment mix, with riskier DB schemes 
leading to offers with a lower cash 
component. 
- Risk in the bidder’s own pension 
liabilities increases the probability of a 
higher proportion of cash in the offer but 
reduces the value gains to its own 
shareholders (contrary to the usual 
finding that cash offers provide better 
returns to acquiring firms).  
- The target pension scheme type does 
not impact on the bidding shareholder’s 
wealth gains directly, and only have an 
indirect impact on payment currency 
choice.
Y 
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Background 
ension schemes, when offered, are of 
different types. In defined benefit 
schemes, members are guaranteed 
post-retirement benefits that are often a 
function of their length of service and final 
salary at the time of retirement. Both the 
employer and the employee contribute 
periodically an agreed percentage of the 
employee’s salary. In defined contribution 
schemes the sponsor contributes an agreed 
amount or percentage of the employee’s salary 
to the pension ‘pot’ to which the employee may 
also contribute. These contributions are 
invested and the accumulated assets, including 
investment returns, become the source of 
income used to fund the payment of pension 
benefits in the future. 
The DB sponsor is liable to meet the 
commitment to paying the post-retirement 
benefits. The scheme’s liabilities towards its 
members are thus effectively the liabilities of 
the sponsor. In funded schemes the 
contributions made by the employer and the 
employees are invested and the assets so 
created are used to meet the pension liabilities. 
Where the liabilities exceed the assets, i.e., 
there is a pension (funding) deficit, the sponsor 
may have to make additional contributions to 
eliminate the deficit or reduce it in accordance 
with an agreement with the trustees of the 
pension scheme. In many jurisdictions, such as 
the US or the UK, such contributions may be 
mandated by a pension regulatory regime 
established under law. In several countries, a 
pension regulator has the power to mandate 
and enforce contributions towards deficit 
reduction, e.g. The Pensions Regulator in the 
UK (see below). 
In contrast to the DB schemes, a DC scheme 
sponsor has no liability to pay a pre-determined 
level of pension benefit to the members of the 
scheme on retirement. Conceptually, the DB 
scheme is similar to a wholly owned subsidiary 
of the sponsor and it generally imposes a much 
higher liability on the employer than a DC 
scheme. In a DB scheme, pension liabilities 
accumulate, and are discharged, over several 
decades, making valuation of the future 
pension benefit obligations to members 
uncertain. A DB scheme thus poses greater risk 
to the debt holders and shareholders of the 
scheme sponsor, thereby raising its cost of 
capital and potentially jeopardising its capital 
investments. 
But there is also a direct cash flow impact 
arising from the contributions made by the 
sponsor, which depend on the actuarial 
valuation of the scheme’s pension benefit 
liabilities and its assets, the time scale for deficit 
reduction as per agreement with the trustees 
and any mandatory contribution imposed by the 
regulator. 
The regulator’s role 
However, these consequences will also depend 
on what role the pension regulation in that 
country plays in determining how it discharges 
its pension benefit obligations, including 
contributions towards deficit reduction and any 
levy towards a statutory pension guarantee 
scheme. Debt arising from the underfunding 
may have been included in the company’s 
balance sheet in which case its stock price likely 
reflects the additional liability and its risk level. 
These deficits can be extremely large. For 
example, BAE Systems has a gross pension 
liability of 170% of market capitalisation, and a 
deficit of 32% of market capitalisation. In the 
wake of the Brexit vote in June 2016, UK DB 
pension schemes had an aggregate record 
£460bn deficit, which has since moderated 
given the movement in bond yields and asset 
prices (see Figure 1 on the next page for the 
growth of that deficit through early 2016). 
As well as impacting investment decisions, the 
funding status of a scheme could clearly impact 
M&A decisions on both the acquirer and target 
sides. For the bidder, the challenge is to 
assess, through its due diligence, whether such 
risk is correctly reflected in the pre-bid price of 
the target and what the adjustment to the offer 
price / premium needs to be if it believes the risk 
is under- or over-estimated in the pre-bid target 
P 
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price. The bidder has also to consider that the 
pre-bid target price may reflect the pension 
scheme-related risk from the target’s 
perspective and not from the bidder’s should 
the latter’s debt covenants be impacted. And 
the decision could soon be taken out of the 
hands of those directly involved. 
‘The regulator should have the right to approve 
or disapprove any corporate transaction that 
might disadvantage pensioners’ said Lady 
Judge, the outgoing head of the Pension 
Protection Fund (Financial Times, July 2016). 
She also said that if the regulator had had that 
right, it would have blocked the £1 sale of BHS 
by Philip Green, which at the time had a £570m 
deficit in that year. 
The UK framework  
UK firms operate DB, DC or indeed no scheme 
at all. The Pensions Act 2004 (PA2004), 
amended by the Pensions Act 2008, is 
designed to protect the interests of members of 
occupational pension schemes (OPS). PA2004 
was set up by The Pensions Regulator (TPR) 
who monitors such schemes and ensures 
compliance with pension laws. Registered 
schemes enjoy tax-free investment returns and 
sponsor contributions are tax-deductible. 
TPR has wide-ranging and proactive powers to 
impose contribution rates and moral hazard 
powers to direct employers and connected 
parties to make contributions to underfunded 
DB schemes. OPS are set up as trusts and 
trustees must act in the interests of scheme 
members even if nominated by the sponsor. 
Trustees appoint investment managers to 
manage the scheme assets. They have to 
undertake triennial actuarial valuations of 
scheme assets and liabilities, estimate the 
funding deficit and also produce annual reports. 
The actuary certifies the scheme funding and its 
solvency. 
 
Figure 1: UK pension scheme deficits (Source: PPF, Highcharts.com) 
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What we set out to investigate  
Payment mix is one of the risk management 
tools available to acquirers since it allocates 
post-acquisition risk between acquirer and 
target shareholders. However, very few studies 
have examined how the pension schemes 
operated by target firms influence the choice of 
payment currency by bidders and the resultant 
value gains to bidder shareholders, even 
though pension deficits and liabilities have 
ballooned in recent years (see above), thereby 
increasing the risk profile of firms. Acquirers of 
targets with substantial pension scheme 
liabilities expose themselves to a substantial 
increase in leverage and financial risk. 
What was known 
Given the size of pension-related liabilities of 
some acquired firms, it is perhaps surprising 
that most prior studies that examined the 
determinants of payment currency seem to 
have largely ignored this potentially important 
factor. Although the impact of pension scheme 
liabilities on payment currency choice and 
shareholder value gains is the subject of a study 
by Cocco and Volpin (2013) 1, they consider the 
impact only of own schemes and not of both 
bidders and targets, amongst other issues. 
Cocco and Volpin, in the only published study 
to date dealing with the impact of pension 
schemes on takeovers, find that targets with DB 
schemes are less likely to be acquired than 
those with non-DB schemes, consistent with 
the higher risk associated with DB schemes. 
They also find bidders operating DB schemes 
in deficit are significantly more likely to offer 
cash (in their view to minimise any information 
asymmetry that the target shareholders face 
given the difficulty of assessing the acquirer’s 
pension liabilities). They report that value gains 
to acquirer shareholders are lower the higher 
the acquirer pension scheme deficit but this 
negative effect is moderated when the payment 
mix is cash rather than stock. On the other 
hand, the value gains to target shareholders are 
                                                          
1 Cocco, J.F. and Volpin, P.F. Journal of Financial 
and Quantitative Analysis, 2013 
not impacted by the target’s pension scheme 
deficit or its interaction with the payment mix (in 
other words, your pension scheme deficit might 
hurt your chances of being bid for, but if there 
actually is a bid the value creation for you will 
not be impacted). However, they do not analyse 
the impact of target pension schemes on the 
payment mix choice of the bidders. Importantly 
they do not deal with the endogeneity (e.g., 
causality direction) of the mix currency choice 
in estimating shareholder gains. 
Our approach 
In addition to the aforementioned gaps in the 
analysis, Cocco and Volpin’s work modelling 
the bidder’s announcement period returns 
controls for the bidder’s own DB scheme deficit 
and not for the target’s. Furthermore, we 
believe it is necessary to take into account both 
the pension scheme assets and liabilities (i.e., 
the absolute size of the pension scheme and 
not just the deficit). Otherwise a major scheme 
that happens to be in surplus may be 
concealing a significant potential contingent 
liability. 
Furthermore, they focus on only one type of 
pension scheme (i.e., DB), whereas we 
consider DB, DC and no scheme subsamples. 
We believe that our study therefore fills an 
important gap in the takeover, corporate 
finance and pension liabilities research and of 
particular interest to dealmakers. 
The methodology 
Our analysis uses a sample of 138 United 
Kingdom takeover bids announced during 
2002-12. The UK has a long history of corporate 
pension schemes established under trust and 
pension laws and overseen by a pension 
regulator. It also has the second most active 
market in corporate control, next to the US. 
Thus it provides an appropriate setting for 
examining the impact of pension liabilities on 
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the bidder’s payment mix and the consequent 
shareholder value outcomes. 
We estimate the market-adjusted abnormal 
returns with an approach in line with many 
recent studies. The announcement period 
abnormal returns are estimated using the 
market-relative performance. We estimate the 
shareholder gains (the treatment effect) using 
the conventional cumulative abnormal returns 
(CAR) methodology over the period -2 to +2 
days centred on the announcement day, Day 0. 
Abnormal return is the excess of the return to 
the bidder (or target) shareholders over the 
corresponding return of the FTSE 350 Index, a 
broad-based UK stock market proxy. We then 
regress the estimated CARs on relevant 
variables including target pension scheme 
variables. 
The usual disclaimer! 
Whether short-term event studies are 
meaningful measures of M&A success is 
determined by your view of the efficiency of the 
stock market. Market efficiency refers to the 
assumption that all relevant information 
available is quickly incorporated in market 
prices that should reflect the discounted sum of 
the expected cash flows delivered by a 
particular stock. In this case the share price 
move upon the deal announcement is taken as 
representing the value destruction or value 
creation of the deal. Two of the obvious 
weaknesses of such a standpoint are the 
influence of merger arbitrage funds (buying the 
target stock, selling the acquirer, regardless of 
the merits or otherwise of the transaction) and 
whether the future of what may be a complex 
transaction can really be established in just a 
few days post-merger. There is also a danger 
that the deal may not have been evaluated on 
its own merits but on the success or failure of 
the previous deals undertaken by the company, 
the market assuming that if a company got the 
last deal right it is more likely to do so the next 
time. 
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Our findings 
etails of the 138 deals analysed are 
given in the Appendix, with the type of 
pension scheme involved, the size of 
the deal and the year of transaction. It also 
shows the volume and value of deals by year 
and pension scheme type. DB scheme targets 
represents 61% of the sample by number but 
92% by deal value. The mean (median) deal 
value is £2,822m (£627m) for DB targets but 
considerably smaller for other targets. The 
much larger size of DB targets is not surprising 
since DB schemes are often historical legacies 
associated with mature industrial and other 
companies, which tend to be larger. DC 
schemes are of relatively recent adoption by UK 
firms, which therefore tend to be smaller. 
Results 
We find that the target pension scheme’s risk 
profile has a significant impact on the payment 
currency choice of the bidder. The riskier, target 
DB schemes, reduce the likelihood of the use of 
cash and increase the likelihood of stock or 
non-cash instruments being used in the deal. 
We find that target pension scheme risk does 
not influence bidder shareholder returns 
directly. Their influence seems indirect, via their 
impact on payment mix used. However, bidder 
DB liabilities reduce the returns to 
shareholders, even as they tend to increase the 
cash component of bids, something contrary to 
the usual outcome (see the above mentioned 
studies: Hansen (1987) 2 , Schlingemann 
(2004)3 and Golubov et al (2015)4). Ours is the 
first study to focus on the implications of a wider 
range of target firms’ pension schemes and 
their risk profile for the payment mix decisions 
of acquirers in takeovers. Our results are 
consistent with our hypothesis that such 
schemes would have a significant impact on the 
financing and investment decisions of firms.
Choice of payment mix 
Our primary focus is on target pension scheme 
and its financial risk characteristics as 
‘predictor’ variables, but we control for other 
factors that are likely to influence the bidder’s 
choice of acquisition payment mix – bidder’s 
size, leverage, stock price run-up, stock over-
valuation, cash and liquidity strength and cash 
flow strength. We also control for the risk 
reduction resulting from a diversifying 
acquisition which may allow the bidder to 
choose a ‘riskier’ payment mix by increasing the 
percentage of cash. We control for bidder’s 
pension scheme - whether DB, DC or no 
scheme - and the related pension liability or 
deficit cost variables. In addition, we include 
proforma variables which take into account the 
combined financial and liquidity strength of 
bidders and targets. Since choice of payment 
mix depends on time varying factors such as 
market conditions, interest rates, etc, we control 
for such temporal effects by including the equity 
issuance activity variables together with 
industry and year of sample. 
Our results (below) show that the percentage of 
cash offered by bidders is significantly 
negatively correlated with the presence of a DB 
scheme at the target. Interestingly, bidder DB 
scheme has a positive impact on the likelihood 
of cash as payment currency. This positive 
impact is consistent with the view and evidence 
from Cocco and Volpin that bidders with risky 
pension schemes seek to reduce the 
information asymmetry concerns of target 
shareholders by offering cash in consideration. 
 
 
 
  
 
                                                          
2
 Hansen, R. Journal of Business, 1987 
3
 Schlingemann, F P. Journal of Corporate Finance, 
2004 
4
 Golubov, A, Petmetzas, D and Travlos, N. Review 
of Finance, 2015 
D 
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Figure 2: Regression coefficients vs percentage of cash in takeover offer (Source: Cass Business 
School) 
 
Model 1 Model 2 
Target Defined Benefit pension scheme -1.032** -0.945** 
Target Defined Contribution pension scheme -0.598 -0.507 
Bidder Defined Benefit pension scheme 0.943** 0.699* 
Bidder Defined Contribution pension scheme 0.44 0.39 
* Significant at 10% t statistic, ** significant at 5% t statistic. No indication implies no statistical significance 
Note: In Model 1 we control for bidder financial metrics, in Model 2 for pro-forma financial metrics. As you can see there is no 
real difference in conclusion. 
Shareholder returns 
The most striking result across all the models is 
that target pension scheme variables and 
pension-related variables – DB liabilities and 
DB deficits – whether on their own or in 
interaction with the percentage of cash in 
consideration, are not significant drivers of 
returns. This is in contrast to the significant 
impact of pension-related variables of both 
bidders and targets on the payment currency 
choice, as shown above. Thus the impact of 
target pension schemes and their costs and 
liabilities on shareholder value gains is not 
direct and seems to be intermediated by the 
impact of these variables on the choice of 
payment offered by bidders. In contrast, bidder 
DB liabilities / deal value has a significant and 
negative impact on bidder  
shareholder returns. The payment mix, 
percentage of cash offered, is uniformly 
significant and positive across all the models, 
consistent with the literature on the positive 
impact of cash as payment currency.  
Among the control variables, we find that 
diversifying acquisitions lower bidder 
shareholder returns significantly (stick to the 
knitting!). Strong financial performance, 
reflected in high ROA or EBITDA/Total Assets 
increases shareholder returns significantly. 
Relatively large acquisitions (high DV / Bidder 
MV) significantly reduce shareholder returns, 
consistent with recent research showing the 
relative positive performance of bolt-on deals 
as contrasted with those of ‘mega-mergers’. 
Figure 3: Shareholder value gains (%) as measured over (-2 to +2 days) centred on announcement day versus independent 
variables (Source: Cass Business School)
 
Statistical significance indicated by shading density, from no shading = no significance up to full shading for significance at the 
1% level. 
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Conclusions and recommendations 
onsistent with what you might expect, 
we find that an acquisition of a 
company with a riskier pension scheme 
is likely to be financed with a lower proportion 
of cash and a higher proportion of stock. This 
implies that bidders match the risk profile of 
target pension schemes with a countervailing 
risk profile of the payment mix they offer. We 
also find that bidders with high risk DB pension 
schemes seek to assuage the valuation risk 
concerns that they pose target shareholders by 
offering more cash. However, these same high 
risk bidders make deals that are associated 
with reduced gains for their own shareholders.  
We do not find support for the idea of a 
significant impact from target pension risk on 
bidder shareholder returns from takeovers. It 
appears that the impact on shareholder returns 
is not significant once the primary impact on the 
payment mix decision is taken into account. We 
find that bidder shareholder wealth gains are 
impacted by a number of other factors that 
make sense from an academic literature and 
capital markets experience viewpoint:  relatively 
large and diversifying acquisitions are 
associated with smaller bidder returns whereas 
the bidder’s or the bidder-cum-target’s stronger 
financial performance is associated with 
stronger bidder returns.  
Some market-related recommendations:  
- If you are looking for likely bidders for 
targets with DB scheme issues, they may 
be ones you don’t expect. They may well 
be those who are likely to do a deal with a 
low cash component in the bid (i.e., this 
may mean corporates with weaker balance 
sheets, something unlikely to please a 
potentially hostile regulator). 
 
- If you have issues of your own with a DB 
scheme you should resolve them (buyout, 
risk transfer to an insurance company, 
increase funding, etc.) before bidding for 
another company. 
 
- The status of a target’s pension scheme 
will not in itself impact the returns on the 
deal if you make the optimal payment mix 
choice. 
 
 
C 
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Appendix
The initial sample includes takeover bids announced from January 2002 to the end of December 2012 
for UK public companies listed on the London Stock Exchange and included in the FTSE350 index. 
2002 is the first year for which pension data was  to be reported in full in the company’s financial 
statements under the UK Financial Reporting Standard (FRS) 17. The bid announcement dates are 
collected from the SDC Platinum database. Further sampling criteria are the following: information on 
these firms, including firm financial variables, pension plan scheme status and pension scheme 
liabilities, must be available from public sources. Both the acquirer and the target should be publicly-
listed companies. 
Figure 4: Number and value of takeover bids by year and pension scheme of target 
(Source: Cass Business School) 
 
ALL DB DC NP 
Year Number Value 
(£m) 
Number Value 
(£m) 
Number Value 
(£m) 
Number Value 
(£m) 
2002 8 1,476 4 1,039 2 231 2 206 
2003 10 5,387 8 5,122 2 264 - - 
2004 12 6,136 9 5,877 2 71 1 188 
2005 19 21,325 14 18,697 2 1,042 3 1,586 
2006 22 63,164 19 61,797 3 1,367 - - 
2007 17 100,483 9 97,492 6 2,946 2 45 
2008 15 34,004 8 26,232 5 7,624 2 148 
2009 11 14,980 6 14,253 2 86 3 642 
2010 14 19,720 4 5,192 9 14,499 1 29 
2011 9 2,514 2 1,298 4 712 3 505 
2012 1 12 1 12 - - - - 
Total 138 269,202 84 237,012 37 28,842 17 3,348 
Mean  1,951  2,822  780  197 
Median  344  627  139  123 
Deal values sourced from SDC Platinum are stated in dollars. We use Datastream’s exchange rate to convert the deal value to 
pounds at the date of the bid offer. DB = defined benefit scheme; DC = Defined contribution scheme; NP = No plan (scheme) 
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